The different dimensions of organizational issues relating to technology developments in ICTs encompass the following:
- Industry-specific vs. ICT convergence regulator: A telecom regulator is an example of an industry-specific regulator, while an ICT convergence regulator will cover a broader horizontal field, also including broadcasting infrastructures, for example.
- Infrastructure vs. infrastructure and content regulator: An infrastructure regulator will regulate the infrastructural levels while leaving the content issues aside, whereas a combined infrastructure and content regulator in a vertical manner includes both.
- Sector vs. multi-sector regulator: A sector regulator includes, for example, all ICT infrastructures, while a multi-sector regulator, for instance, covers different infrastructural sectors (utilities) such as telecoms, water and electricity.
- Industry or sector-specific vs. general competition regulator: An industry or sector-specific regulator deals with industry and sector-specific issues (provided there is an industry or sector-specific regulation), while a general competition regulator deals with general competition rules but may include more industry or sector-specific regulations under its domain. However, an industry or sector-specific regulator and a general competition regulator do not necessarily exclude one another, but often co-exist.
These are the issues examined in this sub-section. However, in order to complete the picture, the following organizational issues also have to be dealt with in a broader analysis of the potentially different organizational models to implement:
- Local vs. national regulator: A local regulator can, for instance, be a state regulator as the public utility commissions in the US, while the national regulator in this case is the FCC (Federal Communications Commission).
- Functional vs. industry or sector regulator: A functional regulator regulates specific functional issues, for instance universal service, as in the case of the Universal Service Agency of South African, while an industry or sector-specific regulator deals with the wider range of functional issues of an industry or sector.
- Independent regulator vs. part of ministry: An independent regulator needs to be a separate organizational entity. However, the regulatory functions can also be performed by a section of a ministerial department as is, for instance, the case in Japan with telecom. The issue of independence is, however, a wide-ranging field with a broad spectrum of possible relations between the regulatory functions of regulators and the policy-making functions of ministries.
Even though the kinds of regulatory agencies dealing with telecom are relatively diverse depending on national circumstances, the archetypal regulatory organization in the telecom area established as part of the regulatory reform process of the 1980s and 1990s is an industry-specific regulator. With the increasing convergence development technologically and on the markets, discussions have, however, taken place in all national contexts as to whether an ICT convergence regulator, covering a broader array of ICT related issues including telecom, broadcasting and IT, would be more appropriate. The arguments in favor of a convergent regulator are strong, as different ICT infrastructures can be used for the conveyance of the same services (horizontal convergence), and as one common regulator for all ICT infrastructures, therefore, seems to be the obvious choice.
The developments of convergence between telecom, IT, broadcasting and other media have also led to discussions on the convergence of infrastructure regulation and content regulation, as broadcasting and other media mainly are content industries. The argument could be that it would be unwise to separate the regulation of broadcast infrastructures and content, as these issues are interrelated to some extent. In countries with strict content regulation, licensing of network operators including content considerations is one of the ways to control content. The argument against is, however, strong, as infrastructure and content regulation are two very different topics. The horizontal convergence and the vertical divergence also speak against a common infrastructure and content regulator.
With respect to multi-sector regulators, an argument in favor is that there can be commonalities in some of the objects of regulation. Utilities like electricity, gas, water or railway companies can, for instance, deploy optical fibers for telecom purposes in their ducts. However, the arguments relating to the issues of regulation are stronger. There are some commonalities in the economics of different infrastructures, which means that some of the regulatory issues are the same and that there can be economies of scope in the regulation of different infrastructures together. An important argument against this, on the other hand, is that these commonalities are too weak to justify a common regulator.
The question of industry/sector-specific regulation and general competition regulation is also related to new technology and convergence developments in the ICT field, as horizontal convergence between different infrastructures entails the possibility of inter-infrastructure competition and, therefore, may increase competition allowing for a stronger reliance on general competition regulation and less industry or sector-specific regulation. The primary argument against abolishing an industry or sector-specific regulator and relying solely on a general competition regulator is the continuing existence of industry or sector-specific regulation, and the need to transpose the knowledge on this specific regulation into a competition regulator. This can be done by having a specific section with special ICT market competences in the competition authority. However, industry or sector specific regulation is, in a sense, alien to a competition regulator. However, to the extent that industry or sector specific regulators increasingly use regulatory tools from general competition regulation, it becomes more natural to transfer the regulation of ICT markets to a competition regulator.