Interconnection regulation can apply equally to all telecommunications carriers (symmetric regulation) or to incumbent carriers only (asymmetric regulation).
Asymmetric interconnection regulation is very common. The rationale for asymmetric regulation is to redress the consequences of market power. Asymmetric regulation does this by placing additional requirements on incumbent or dominant operators that might otherwise be able to prevent or deter competition.
For example, United States and Canadian regulators impose an interconnection obligation on all firms classed as telecommunications carriers. However, only incumbent firms are required to unbundle and share network components.
In Europe, the European Union requires National Regulatory Authorities, in markets that are not effectively competitive, to impose regulations on those operators with significant market power.
Asymmetric regulation can be useful in addressing existing imbalances in ICT markets. However, the need for asymmetric regulation should be kept under regular review. As market conditions change, new firms enter the market, and new competitive services emerge, market power can be eroded. Where this occurs, regulators need to reconsider the justification for asymmetric regulation and, if market power is no longer a concern, remove the additional requirements.
RELATED INFORMATION
Market Power
Competition Policy and Regulation
Overview of Interconnection
Free Trade Negotiations