2.6.7 Remedies for Tying and Bundling

There are few circumstances in which tying can be profit-enhancing for the firm concerned. Accordingly firms with market power will often have no incentive to engage in a tying strategy.

In recognition of this, the courts in the United States have developed a four-part test for analyzing allegations of tying (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Test for Alleged Tying

In addition to the tests illustrated in Figure 1, some courts require that the alleged harm exceed any efficiencies produced by the alleged tying, before allowing a complaint to proceed.

Bundling is generally a pro-competitive, and customer friendly, strategy. As such bundling does not call for regulatory intervention.

RELATED INFORMATION

Tying and Bundling

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