Top–level spectrum objectives have been discussed in Section 1.2.2 above. Here we discuss how best to position the regulator to achieve those objectives, and how outsourcing and delegation can assist.
The fundamental issue here is how to divide up spectrum management responsibilities among the government, an independent spectrum regulator, and private sector organisations to which some of these tasks can be subcontracted by outsourcing, and the licensees themselves, which can be asked to undertake some ‘self-regulation’, possibly on a co-operative basis.
This raises broad questions over what type of body should exercise power over spectrum management decisions, as well as narrower ones about how particular functions can most efficiently be performed.
The broader question over how power to regulate spectrum should be exercised depends upon a country's constitutional circumstance, its political and legal systems and possibly its stage of development and the nature of the demand for spectrum- in particular whether spectrum is a scarce and highly valuable resource, or whether it be made available to at least the bulk of demands placed upon it.
It is clear that strategic decisions about the regulation of spectrum should not be undertaken by operators themselves, which would naturally pursue their own special interests. This same principle is set out in the WTO’s Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications, which, in relation to regulation of telecommunications more generally requires that;
‘The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulator shall be impartial with respect to all market participants.’
The regulator's independence from government is a separate matter. There are arguments that a democratically accountable government is entitled to exercise key responsibilities over the development of a major sector of the economy, such as wireless communications, and there are concerns that there is a risk that such decisions will become politicized and that this will introduce uncertainty about regulation on the part of investors, which might in consequence fail to put up the necessary capital to build the networks.
The issue of the location of regulatory power is discussed in Institutional Arrangements and the more technical issue of outsourcing is discussed in Outsourcing Functions.